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The present paper is dedicated to Dr. Horea Sandi, a prominent scientist of Romanian structural
and earthquake engineering, to honor his endeavours dedicated to the research school created in
INCERC and in Romania, to his contribution in EAEE Working groups, to his life - time work on a
conceptual and applicative framework in seismic risk and vulnerability analysis to fit specific patterns
of Vrancea and Romania conditions.
The 80-th anniversary of Dr. Horea Sandi is a perfect opportunity to review results from our recent
research related to the consequences of the 1977 Vrancea  earthquake, 35 years after its occurrence,
as the authors benefited of first hand knowledge, warm guidance and cooperation from Dr. Sandi
along decades.
ABSTRACT
Although its socio-economic disaster pattern was
obvious, the March 4, 1977 Vrancea, Romania
earthquake was studied mainly in seismological
and earthquake engineering terms. In 1977, the loss
data released in Romania, referred to 32,900
collapsed or heavily damaged dwellings, 35,000
homeless  families,  thousands  of  damaged
buildings, many other damages and destructions
in industry and economy, 1,578 people killed, 11,321
people injured (with 90% of the killed and 67% of
the injured being in the city of Bucharest). The
Romanian government reported the economic
losses from this event in December 1977, as being
US$ 2 billion. For a long time, the evaluation of
human casualties vs. collapse pattern of buildings
in 1977 was not addressed and we still miss integral
data. The recovery and reevaluation of economic
and social impacts of the 1977 disaster was a
concern of the authors, with the intent to better
understand its consequences and prepare a new
strategy of seismic risk reduction in view of future
earthquakes in Romania, and in order to fill that
gap the authors recovered many unpublished and
obscure data.
Keywords: building damage; collapse and casualty
patterns; territorial loss distribution
REZUMAT
Deşi specificul de dezastru socio-economic a fost
evident, cutremurul de Vrancea de la 4 martie 1977
din România a fost studiat în principal cu privire la
seismologie şi ingineria seismică. În 1977, datele
date publicităţii despre pierderile la cutremur se
refereau la 32.900 clădiri de locuit prăbuşite sau
grav avariate, 35.000 familii rămase fără locuinţă,
mii de clădiri avariate, multe alte avarieri şi distrugeri
în industrie şi economie, 1.578 pierderi de vieţi,
11.321 răniţi (90% dintre pierderile e vieţi şi 67%
dintre răniţi fiind in Bucureşti). În decembrie 1977,
conducerea României a raportat 2 miliarde de dolari
pierderi economice ca urmare a acestui eveniment.
Mult timp nu s-au studiat efectele asupra oamenilor
în raport cu specificul prăbuşirilor din 1977 iar
datele  complete  nu  sunt  încă  disponibile.
Recuperarea şi reevaluarea impactului economic
şi social al dezastrului din 1977 i-a preocupat pe
autori, cu intenţia de a înţelege mai bine conse-
cinţele sale şi a pregăti o nouă strategie de reducere
a riscului seismic pentru a face faţă viitoarelor
cutremure din România; pentru a compensa lipsa
de  date,  autorii  au  recuperat  multe  date
nepublicate, aparent nesemnificative.
Cuvinte cheie: avarii clădiri; specific prăbuşiri şi
efecte asupra oamenilor; distribuţia teritorială a
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1.DATA ON  MARCH 4, 1977 DAMAGE,
LOSSES  AND  IMPACT  AND
RATIONALE  FOR  THEIR
RE-EVALUATION
The sources for the data on March 4, 1977
Vrancea earthquake losses were the initial official
communiqués, local technical books, papers and
some reports by international specialist delegations.
Damage referred to 32,900 collapsed or heavily
damaged dwellings, tens of thousands of damaged
properties, many other damages and destructions
in 763 commercial and industrial units and other
effects in the whole spectrum of the economy.
Casualties were reported in 1977, in rounded
figures, as 1,570 deaths, 11,300 injured, with
35,000 homeless families. Visiting foreign specialists
received summary information and photographs of
collapses from local officials, and they were also
allowed to visit some of the damaged areas. These
post-earthquake reconnaissance reports and studies
presented seismological, engineering issues and
some disaster management aspects and were made
available to Romanian staff and specialists of the
time (Berg et al., 1977; Fattal et al., 1977; Moinfar,
1978; Tezcan et al., 1977; EERI Report, 1977;
JICA Report, 1977; AIJ Report, 1978 etc.). The
earthquake engineering research developed
afterwards was to a great extent done by Sandi
(1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1999), Sandi et al.
(1978, 1990, 1994, 2002, 2007). The Vrancea
earthquakes of 1986 and 1990 provided additional
knowledge while causing mostly non-structural
damage, although they also inflicted a small number
of casualties (Georgescu and Pomonis, 2010, 2011).
Some papers favorably appreciated the
management of the emergency situation in Romania
in 1977 comparing it in contrast to the earthquake
in Nicaragua in 1972 (Jones and Avgar, 1977;
Ebert, 1986). On the other hand members of the
US Congress criticized Romanian authorities for the
aid distribution to population (US Congress
Records, 1977).
In 1977-78 a special action was undertaken
by the Central Institute ICCPDC-Bucharest to
collect data on damage from ministries and counties,
but most of these data were considered classified
material and were not made known to the public. In
1978, the first edition of an extensive four volume
report was published, with limited circulation,
addressing the damage incurred and lessons learned,
with some data on the territorial spread of damages
(ICCPDC, 1978).  This was followed in 1982 by
the publication of a special volume on the earthquake
which contained the results of detailed damage
surveys and extensive engineering and engineering
seismology studies (Balan et al., 1982). However,
the economic value and social effects of the
earthquake were never discussed in detail and were
generally given limited consideration in all of the
above reports and official communiqués. Some
ICCPDC reports that include a preliminary valuation
of damages became available only after the 1990’s.
The World Bank Report of 1978 was the only
contemporary report addressing the socio-
economic aspects on the 1977 earthquake in some
detail referring to the government’s US$ 2 billion
loss estimate and including more detailed figures on
loss by economic sector and impact considerations.
This report was used as background information
for a loan to Romania (World Bank, 1978) and was
neither quoted in local references nor available in
Romania until 1992. The US Foreign Disaster
Assistance Office (OFDA, 1988) indicate the same
total loss, while others (Munich Re, 1998; Coburn
and Spence, 1992; 2002) suggest only some US$
800 million loss.
Many direct and indirect loss data were
presumably underestimated or neglected in 1977,
while other economic losses were only briefly
described (World Bank, 1978; ICCPDC, 1978).
Although the consequences of the earthquake were
truly significant and the Romanian authorities used
this argument to obtain foreign loans and assistance,
the immediate and long-term impact on development
were not treated as a matter of public concern and
debate in Romania.
However, many international analysts referred
to the 1977 earthquake in studies on East European
economies and their first international concern about
the 1977 disaster impact was related to Romania’s
capacity to pay its debts and secure its economic
growth (Jackson, 1977, cited in Burakow, 1980).
After the fall of the communist regimes, several
retrospective studies estimated that the 1977
earthquake greatly contributed to the slow-down23 CONSTRUCŢII – Nr. 2 / 2011
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of Romania’s economy (Deletant, 2002; Deletant
and Ionescu, 2004), with even KGB defectors
making similar allegations (Andrew and Gordievsky,
1990).
All former impact evaluations considered the
ratio of losses to the Gross National Product-GNP
(or to the Gross Domestic Product-GDP), whose
size was difficult if not impossible to be accurately
estimated in US$ or any foreign currency at the time
of earthquake. The GNP or GDP evolution of
Romania until 1989 and the GNP of all East
European countries have been frequently re-
evaluated (Jackson, 1985, Lancieri, 1993).
2.DETAILED  DATA  ON 1977
EARTHQUAKE  DAMAGE AND
ECONOMIC  LOSS
2.1. Data of World Bank Report (1978)
The categories, sectors and values of the
damage (loss) caused by the 1977 earthquake are
compiled from the 1978 World Bank report and
presented in Table 1. The World Bank Report of
1978 indicates that the data was based on an
immediate estimation by the authorities of the time.
It seems that an Aggregate Damage Report by the
Romanian Ministry of Finance was sent in July 6,
1977, but there is no indication in the report about
how dollar values were obtained and by whom.
According to the report, out of 40 counties, 23
were strongly affected, with Bucharest recording the
highest loss, accounting for 70% of the total, i.e.
US$ 1.4 billion.
Counties in the south-east of the country
(Teleorman, Dolj and Prahova) but also in north-
east (Iasi, Bacau) suffered significant damage. The
World Bank Report concludes that the overall effect
of the earthquake on the housing sector of Romania
was
 156,000 apartments in urban zones and
21,500 houses in rural zones were
destroyed or very seriously damaged;
 366,000 apartments in urban zones and
117,000 houses in rural areas needed to
be repaired.
Table 1.
Inventory of damage (loss) caused by the March 4, 1977 earthquake (Source: World Bank Report
No. P-2240-RO, 17 May 1978, grouped in direct and indirect losses by the authors)
No. Sector
Total
damage
value
million
US$
Of which
Direct Indirect
Construction
(buildings,
water
supply)
Equipment,
Installations
and
Transport
Raw materials,
intermediate
and consumer
goods
Production
losses
1 Industry 447.3 102.7 20.0 28.4 296.2
2 Agriculture 124.4 46.4 10.7 17.0 50.3
3 Transport,
Communications
and  Retail Trade
93.2 52.1 14.4 14.7 12.0
4 Health, Education
and Socio-cultural
167.3 147.5 18.1 - 1.7
5 Housing 1,032.8 1,015.0 17.8 - -
6 Local Industry,
Utilities and
Construction
87.6 56.4 23.3 3.4 4.5
7 Miscellaneous
Private Goods
95.4 - - 95.4 -
8 Total 2,048.0 1,420.1 104.3 158.9 364.724 CONSTRUCŢII – Nr. 2 / 2011
No Other indirect losses
Value
(million US$)
1 Lost  exports over two years 250.0
2 Supplementary exports to  replace lost equipments and expand
construction industry capacity
350.0
3 Tourist receipts loss in 1977 30.0
4 Loans and credits on different terms 190.3
5 Total I (World Bank data) 820.3
6
Unpaid extra days work for recovery, donations, contributions (20 billion
Lei, converted by the author at 20 lei/US$)
1,000.0
7 Repair works of damaged houses in own households (author’s evaluation) 675.0
Total (World Bank data and other estimations) 2,495.3
The sum of the above is 660,500 dwelling units
or around 11% of Romania’s dwelling stock at the
time. These data were not commonly discussed in
Romania, where the figure most frequently mentioned
is that of 32,900 destroyed or heavily damaged
dwellings and occasionally a figure of 182,000
damaged dwellings is also mentioned.Using other
descriptive data from the World Bank Report, the
values in Table 2 have been obtained.
From Tables 1 and 2 it results:
- the total reported losses account for US$
2.048 billion (US$ 1.683 billion in direct
losses and US$ 0.3647 billion in indirect-
production losses);
- the loss to constructions represented 69.4%
of the total and 84.3% of the direct losses;
the housing sector losses (US$1.0328
billion) represented 71.4% of construction
losses, or 61.4% of the direct losses and
50.4% of the total losses;
- the loss in industry represented 21.8% of
the total; the indirect-production losses were
prevalent in industry and agriculture, while
in transport, communication, health,
education, local industry the loss to
constructions was prevailing;
- other non-reported,  indirect losses, could
amount to around US$ 2.4953 billion as
roughly assessed in Table 2; with the total
indirect losses reaching as much as US$
2.860 billion and the ratio of indirect to
direct losses being 1.7;
- by adding the reported and estimated losses,
the total possible loss could reach US$
4.5433 billion.
The fact that the damage from the 1977
earthquake was extensive is also evidenced by the
fact that Romania received aid from 55 countries
and 12 organizations. Other long term socio
economic consequences of damage remain to be
estimated (Georgescu and Pomonis, 2007, 2008).
2.2. Data on territorial distribution of
losses based on ICCPDC reports,
Romania (1978)
In the ICCPDC reports issued by each affected
ministry and county separately, the overall amount
of losses is given in physical units and reaches values
of as much as 32,897 collapsed or demolished
dwellings, 34,582 homeless families and 763
industrial units affected and many other damages in
all sectors. The ICCPDC reports are internal reports
with detailed data that were produced by the
authorities at the request of the Central Government.
The aggregation of the loss was made at the end of
1978, in the local currency (Romanian Lei). Damage
is given in number of collapsed and damaged
dwellings or apartments, as well as in number of
strengthening and repairs needed, and units of social
Table 2.
Value of other indirect losses for March 4, 1977 earthquake, indicated in
World Bank Report No. P-2240-RO, 17 May 1978 and / or evaluated by the authors
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and cultural buildings in 19 counties plus Bucharest
City. In total there were:
- 742,259 collapsed or damaged dwell-ings,
out of which 35,600 dwellings were
collapsed or condemned (4.8%), 351,835
dwellings to be strengthened (47.4%) and
354,824 dwellings to be repaired (47.8%);
- 8,228 social-cultural units lost and
damaged, representing 28.8% of national
stock.
The total damage value from these two
categories is Romanian Lei 3,725,177,000, out of
which Bucharest damage accounts for Lei
1,553,362,000 (excluding social-cultural buildings
of ministries and central institutions that have not been
reported for Bucharest). Housing represented
90.45% of this total loss, while social and cultural
buildings represented 9.55%. Loss data from 20
ministries having assets in 25 affected counties
amounts to Romanian Lei 3,523,194,000. The 763
industrial units included 2,491 objects and 1,077,000
square meters of production floor area. The territorial
loss was heavy in many counties as percentages of
damage indicate both in physical units and values.
Thus, the total loss derived from the ICCPDC
reports (December 1978) reaches Romanian Lei
7,248,371,000.
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Fig. 1. Territorial distribution (20 affected counties) of ratios of dwelling units in “destroyed”,
“to be strengthened” and “to be repaired” buildings vs. the total stock of dwelling units
in 1977 (%) (further details in Georgescu and Pomonis, 2007, 2008)
The ICCPDC reports mention that loss
evaluations considered the legal system of prices
based on assumptions of cost for repair and
strengthening, while some loss was not considered
at all, as for example: debris removal and demolition,
temporary propping, private goods, supplementary
transport, relocation, medical treatment in hospitals,
epidemics prevention, disabled and orphans
pensions, salaries during business resumption, unpaid
extra work etc. There were some counties and
ministries that did not report losses, although it was
known they sustained some damage.
In terms of the relative composition of the losses,
there is some similarity as to the share of housing in
the total ICCPDC loss, but Bucharest’s loss share
cannot be compared since it is given only with
respect to housing and socio-cultural. The above
can thus be considered as a first level estimate of
the actual 1977 loss expressed in Romanian Lei. In
order to convert these to US$ and compare them
with other data, we must check their completeness,
relevance and consider the then applicable exchange
rates.
Figure 1 shows the damage distribution for each
of the 20 affected counties’ 1977 dwelling stock in
buildings that were destroyed (collapsed or to be
demolished), needed strengthening or needed repair
(lighter damage), respectively. We use the colours
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red, yellow and green, as this is an accepted
international convention to portray the three damage-
building safety levels during post-earthquake damage
surveys. For the county of Gorj the number of
dwellings in the category “to be strengthened” has
not been reported.
This territorial distribution of damages gives us
a better understanding and may contain many hidden
messages that we need to explain. The loss was
heavy in many counties and its geographic distribution
surprising, with limited damage in the epicentral
region and extensive damage in distant counties. Each
county’s damage distribution has some meaning,
while the sum of all situations, expressed as the
proportion of affected dwelling units compared to
the total dwelling stock of each county in 1977, may
give a broader overview of the severity of the
damage in each county and Romania as a whole.
In comparison with usual attenuation patterns,
one may wonder why counties in the epicentral
region were largely unaffected, when counties more
than 100-km away, suffered nearly 50% damage
rates. For example, Iasi County (48.8% affected
dwellings) and Bucharest City (45.4% affected
dwellings) are on the first places, although situated
at considerable distances from the Vrancea
seismogenic zone. The large number of old buildings
in Iasi and the long-period effects on slender
buildings in Bucharest are among first explanations
at hand. Dolj County (39.6%) even further from
Vrancea is on the third place, something that to this
day has not been fully explained and a combination
of the previous two causes can be put under debate,
without full arguments for each. One reason may be
that Dolj County was in the lowest zone of the
Romanian earthquake code in the 1963-1977 period
(zone of intensity VI).
Braila County was the 4th worst affected county
in 1977 (32.5% affected dwellings), but
neighbouring Galati County was not affected to the
same extent (11th with 8% of its dwellings affected).
Braila and Galati cities (217,000 and 300,000
people respectively), are built on „loess” which in
the past has caused lots of damage (due to ground
subsidence) related to the rise of the water table,
rise of phreatic waters from the Danube River which
is crossing the cities or from leaks (from the canals),
many old tunnels which caused damage before and
during the earthquake. Also many houses are from
load-bearing masonry in these two counties. Galati
has newer buildings, many areas were rebuilt as the
industries were developed. Could it be also that the
differences in damage between Galati and Braila may
be explained by the effect of loess that is more
extensive in Braila County, since the Danube is
crossing the whole county, while in Galati county
the river is forming the southern border of the county?
Some of the difference could also be due to
attenuation patterns, although Galati County is
somewhat nearer to the Vrancea source zone than
Braila county.
In the south, the towns of Alexandria and
Zimnicea (in Teleorman County, the 5th worst
affected county) had an older housing stock and
being rural areas had a large number of low-income
housing. In these areas, many houses were made
from a mixture of earth and wood and the bricks
were made until in the 60’s from local clay in the
outskirts of each village. The toughness of the bricks
depended of how much fuel and straw, was available
for the local kilns. The mortar used at the time did
not have enough lime. In many cases villagers used
sand and clay mortar and after the 50’s more lime,
cement etc. and gradually industrial bricks. Some
of the difference could also be due to attenuation
patterns, although how can we explain the fact that
Ilfov which is nearer Vrancea than Teleorman was
not seriously affected? Ilfov was also a rural county
though clearly of higher income levels due to its
proximity to Bucharest.
Prahova County, that is 7-th worst affected
county with 14% affected dwellings and was also
seriously affected by the 1940 earthquake and has
always been in zone of intensity VIII of every version
of the Romanian earthquake codes. Vrancea County,
that includes the nominal epicenter, is 13th on the
list of affected counties (with only 5.6% affected
dwellings). As a possible explanation, Vrancea
County was devastated in the 1940 earthquake and
much of its housing was rebuilt after 1945
incorporating ring-beams, with more extensive use
of brick masonry instead of adobe. Vrancea County
has always been in the highest zone of the Romanian
Earthquake Code (the county is found within the
zones of intensity VIII and IX), and although base
shear forces may not be that great as experienced
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during 1977, this must have contributed in the
reduction of damage in Vrancea County.
Buzau County has 9.7% affected dwellings.
Buzau city on the other hand suffered much more
damage in spite of the fact that it is further from the
epicenter, founded on better soil and had better
maintained buildings. The effects of the earthquake
were strongly felt in the Buzau river valley (towards
the hills): Patarlagele, Viperesti, Cislau, Calvini,
Chiojdu etc. This can be related to the earthquake
rupture trace, which has developed along a line
towards the S-E, in Buzau County.
2.3. Comparison of Detailed Losses
The number of damaged housing units derived
from the ICCPDC reports is 12.4% greater than in
the World Bank report that was published somewhat
earlier. In order to compare the total ICCPDC
reported loss in Romanian Lei with the World Bank
one in US$, we need to address the exchange rate
issue.  At the time of the earthquake in Romania
different Lei to US$ exchange rates were used (e.g.
for internal trade, for external trade etc.). For
international comparisons the GNP of countries with
Centrally Planned Economies (CPE) was obtained
in that epoch by the World Bank from domestic data
using applicable exchange rates (in the case of
Romania an exchange rate of 20 Lei per US$ was
used in 1977). A review of the various estimates of
the GNP of CPE’’s is made by Lancieri (1993).
The estimates made by various western bodies and
authorities are notoriously different, and for example
in the case of Romania the estimate of its 1980 GNP
ranges from 34 to 103 billion US$.
If the losses in US$, communicated by the
Romanian Communist Party in December 1977,
recorded by the World Bank report, and the
ICCPDC ones in Romanian Lei had been equivalent,
a rough conversion would lead to a rate of 3.53 Lei
per US$, which is lower than any exchange rate
used at the time. Therefore we tend to believe that
some component of loss was added at central level,
when aggregation was made for communi-cation to
the World Bank. There is a certain feeling that the
number of damaged elements and floor area that
was heavily damaged is acceptably described in
inventories, but other loss values are missing in the
final value of the preliminary ICCPDC loss table.
We may suppose that the missing losses were, at
least, those mentioned before, as well as others that
appear in the World Bank Report of 1978 but were
not reported by ICCPDC for unknown reasons. The
exchange rate for foreign trade (ca. 20 Lei per US$
in 1977) was considered at the time as the one that
was closer to the true value of the local currency.
For comparison if a Romanian citizen brought US$
into the country the conversion rate into Lei was of
4.970 per US$ in 1977 and 4.559 per US$ in 1978.
This exchange rate was at the time considered as
quite unfair.
There are many reasons to believe that
Romania’s 1977 regime possibly reported a smaller
damage extent and impact because:
- the authorities were not sufficiently prepared
to assemble detailed data and investigate the
loss in all aspects; what was at hand was
the direct loss on buildings and infrastructure
in social-economic and industry sectors and
only some indirect losses; the request for
data from the local authorities was mainly
focused on such items;
- the calculation of loss or replacement costs
relied on conventional average apartment
floor areas and fixed costs for repair and
strengthening, that were grossly under-
estimated and unrealistic; later on, it was
common knowledge that construction
enterprises worked at a loss for such time
consuming works; the calculated costs were
not for upgrading the damaged buildings but
to bring their strength to the situation as
before the earthquake;
- a greater reported damage and loss would
have been considered by the regime leaders
as an embarrassment, reports about huge
losses could reduce the country’s credit
rating and place in doubt its ability to pay
foreign debts and such weakness could
have been exploited by the Soviet Union
seeking to regain control;
- admitting to a major loss and impact would
have tarnished Romania’s image.
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GDP or GNP in billion Romanian Lei
and source of data
Exchange
rate in Ro
Lei per
US$
GDP or GNP
value in
billion US $
Direct loss
ratio, using
loss data
from WB
Report
Total loss
ratio, using
data from
WB Report
512.9
(GDP in current prices, from Romanian
data expressed in SNA, Jackson, 1985)
20 25.645 6.56% 7.99%
530.1
(GDP in current prices, Alton 1981, cited
in Jackson, 1985)
20 26.505 6.35% 7.72%
World Bank Report, 1978
(GNP per capita x population)
34.126 4.93% 6.00%
World Bank Atlas, 1977-78
(GNP per capita x population)
33.121 5.08% 6.18%
Marer’s per capita GNP data for 1980
(cited in Lancieri, 1993), discounted for
1977 with 10% average growth.
Alternatives:
- 15.7 % GDP deflator
- 19.2 % CPI deflator
22.172
21.557
7.59%
7.80%
9.23%
9.50%
World Bank, 1977 data, reduced by the
author by 20%, using information from
Lancieri, 1993
25.496 6.66% 8.03%
We are conscious that there is a contradiction
between the finding of a too advantageous exchange
rate and the reasons of a smaller loss reporting
presented above. Only further evaluations may bring
us closer to some truth.
2.4. Alternative Dollar GNP Estimates for
Romania and revised loss to GNP ratio
The Romania annual GNP series from the World
Bank or United Nations or other statistical books
or almanacs are quite different. The GNP of
Centrally Planned Economies-CPE’s has been an
object of study for years, because their Systems of
National Accounts were different (Jackson, 1985).
Lancieri (1993) published a new study on CPE’s
GNP and concluded that past values of GNP per
capita for CPE’s during 1970-1990 were by far too
large. Selecting the available data on Romania’s GDP
or GNP, we obtained alternative results as shown in
Table 3.
Table 3.
Alternative values for Romania’s GDP or GNP in 1977 and corresponding loss to GNP ratio
for the March 4, 1977 earthquake (Georgescu and Pomonis, 2007, 2008)
In table 3 the exchange rate was different,
according to purpose and countries (Jackson,
1985):
- in 1977, the official exchange rate for
Romanian Lei per US$ was of 4.970 , in
1978 - 4.559, in 1979 to 1983 it was 4.470;
it was used for foreign tourists from western
countries;
- in 1977-1980, the non-commercial
exchange rate for Romanian Lei per US$
was of 12.000;
- in 1977, the commercial exchange rate for
Romanian Lei per US$ was of 20.000, in
1978 it was 18.355, in 1979-1980 it was
18.000 and in 1981-1982 it was 15.000.
Since the Romanian officials favoured the use
of commercial rates for GDP conversion, Jackson,
1985, considered this rate as closer to the truth.
According to Table 3, depending on reference
GNP values, we have:
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- the range of direct loss to GDP or GNP ratio
in 1977 could range from 4.9% to 7.8%;
- the range of total loss to GDP or GNP ratio
in 1977 could range from 6.0% to 9.5%;
Using the total possible loss estimated by the
authors (US$ 4.5433 billion) and the alternatives of
GNP, the range of total possible loss ratio to GDP
or GNP in 1977 could range between 13.3% and
21.1%.
2.5. Loss to GNP ratio and comparisons
with other countries
In the economic production mechanism, the
loss of capital assets will reduce the economic
output, while the loss of other elements at risk will
require resources for recovery, slowing down the
development process. Ribaric (1982), Kerpelman
(1990), Klyachko (1994) and Chen (1997) used
the ratio of losses to GNP for comparisons in terms
of loss magnitude. This ratio is easy to use, but
actually only a part of the property loss (fixed assets
and lost inventory) is formally involved in the
economic production. In fact, the loss to GNP ratio
is used as a proxy.  A correct analysis should
separate the loss in specific shares and report the
lost assets relative to the National Wealth and the
lost output of goods and services relative to the GNP.
Although it is known that it is not possible to measure
the impact of disasters in terms of a single financial
figure, World Bank officers consider that any
summed losses that are over 2 % of GDP of a country
can be destructive or even catastrophic (Gurenko,
2004).
A comparison of losses between Romania and
Japan was made in 1992, using some special indices,
while another analysis of the 1977 earthquake losses
was made with the Global Econometric Scaling using
Knowledge on Earthquake Effects; the first estimate
of 1977 earthquake resulted in a property loss of
5% of GNP or 1.63% of National Wealth
(Georgescu & Kuribayashi, 1992, 1994, 1996,
1998; Georgescu, 2002 a).
Comparatively, in Europe, the ratio of
earthquake losses to GNP reached values such as:
15% in Skopje, Yugoslavia, 1963; 1.6% in Friuli,
Italy, 1976; 10% in Montenegro, Yugoslavia, 1979
(with reference to all Yugoslavia GNP) or a ratio of
40% of the GNP of Montenegro; 4.44 % Irpinia,
Italy, 1980. The peak worldwide values are: 41.50
% in Kanto, Japan, 1923; 45.00 % in Managua,
Nicaragua, 1972; 32.16 %-60.00 % in Guatemala,
1976; 25.00 % in El Salvador, 1986.
Romania’s losses in 1977 were presumably
underestimated by comparison to the scale of
damages in other countries, as for instance, the 1963
Skopje and 1979 Montenegro earthquakes in
Yugoslavia and the comparison shows that:
- the ratio of 15% loss after the Skopje, 1963
disaster highlights how the size of loss
increases when the capital city of small
countries is directly affected; the economic
weight of Bucharest in the entire economy
in 1977 was over 10% (Georgescu and
Sandi, 1998, 2000);
- the ratio of 10% loss to GNP after the
Montenegro, 1979 disaster applied to the
GNP data of Yugoslavia leads to a loss of
some US$ 6.3 billion. Since the affected
area and number of damaged elements in
Montenegro were clearly below the extent
of those in Romania, the 1977 losses can
be considered as undervalued.  It is possible
that the unit costs used in Yugoslavia were
higher and closer to international prices. The
extent  of  World  Bank  Projects  in
Montenegro for rehabili-tation purposes
reached some US$ 125 million.
A recent regional earthquake that has some
similar patterns with Romanian earthquake of 1977,
in terms of magnitude and large affected area,
number of damaged buildings and affected industry,
was the 17 August 1999, Izmit, Turkey earthquake.
Initial loss estimates for this event are in the range of
3 to 6.5 billion US$ (equivalent to some 1.5-3.3%
of Turkey’s 1999 GNP).  Significant economic
impacts and fiscal burdens were evaluated by the
World Bank (World Bank, 1999). The November
12, 1999 Duzce aftershock added to the damage.
Erdik (2000, 2002) published data on impact
and evaluated the average total loss (physical and
socio-economic) to be in the range of US$ 16 to
20 billion, about 7-10% of the Turkey’s GDP, out
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of which physical losses were between US$ 4 to
10 billion. Akgiray, Barbarosoglu and Erdik, 2003,
estimated for OECD that the accumulated cost in
terms of both income loss and national wealth loss
is in the range from US$ 9 to 13 billion according to
the State Planning Organization and from US$ 6 to
10 billion according to the World Bank, up to more
than  US$ 15 billion (TUSAID). Considering the
indirect and long-term effects, they believed that it
would not be unrealistic to estimate the total cost at
around US$ 20 billion, about 9-10% of the GDP in
the year of 2000.
The Athens, Mount Parnitha, Greece
earthquake of 7 September 1999, the costliest
natural disaster in Greece’s recent history, is also
comparable with Romania 1977 at least in terms of
some elements at risk affected but not as area. The
total cost was estimated at 3.77 billion Euro; adding
insured losses and other losses that may not be
accounted for, early estimates warned that the total
cost may approach or even exceed 4 billion Euro
(around 3% of Greece’s GDP in 1999; Pomonis,
2002).
If Turkish losses are theoretically discounted
for 1977, they compare well with the Romanian
losses. If Greek loss ratio is considered, the loss
ratio of Romania is well below a reasonable weight.
In the Athens 1999 earthquake for which the dwelling
damage data and loss estimations are quite accurate
there were 217,940 affected dwelling units which is
equivalent to 3.8% of Greece’s dwelling stock at
the time of the earthquake (as opposed to around
12.5% of the Romanian dwelling stock being
affected during the 1977 earthquake).  Of the
affected units, 3.0% collapsed or would be
demolished (0.11% of the total dwellings in Greece,
while in 1977 in Romania around 0.6% of the
country’s dwellings collapsed or were subsequently
demolished).
Thus, we have numerous reasons to look for a
greater loss ratio after March 4, 1977 and in order
to re-evaluate loss to GNP ratio of Romania, both
terms of equation must be re-evaluated using new
data.
3.THE 1977 EARTHQUAKE LOSSES
AND THEIR IMPACT ON
DEVELOPMENT
Based on recovered data, the impact of the
March 4, 1977 earthquake was re-evaluated as
follows (Georgescu and Pomonis, 2007, 2008):
- in visible, direct and indirect terms: the social
and economic impact of the earthquake
weakened an economy that for several years
before 1977 was considered the fastest
growing among the East European
Countries, the Romanian economy started
to slow down from 1980 and eventually
collapsed a decade after 1977;
- in latent terms: hidden, neglected or un-
repaired damage to thousands of large
residential buildings, can become the root
for future damage and hardship.
On the other hand, the 1977 earthquake
provided a great scientific laboratory (Sandi 1982,
1984, 1985, 1986. 1999), unique and valuable
lessons in seismological and engineering terms, as it
led to a change in concepts and regulations, analyzed
elsewhere (Georgescu, 2002 b).
As measures taken to cope with the disaster,
the contemporary data indicate that:
- the situation was under control, there was
no food or water shortage, epidemics were
absent and rescue operations pace was fast;
electricity, telephone, radio and television
broadcasts have resumed within few hours;
transportation networks were operational;
rescue operations started within hours,
citizens volunteered for aid;
- on a short-term, the provisional shelters
were necessary only in some localities,
because the ongoing public investment in
urban housing allowed the government to
provide housing, furniture and goods for the
rescued and the homeless from state funds.
The great extent of physical damage cannot be
denied and figures of the World Bank Report and
ICCPDC Reports stand as proof. Under a system
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of compulsory insurance and controlled use of
money, the paid losses reached Romanian Lei 1.01
billion with the 1977 loss ratio (paid claims over
premium income) reaching 250% (Ciurel, 1997).
The Romanian authorities’ strategy was to keep
the Five Year Plan development targets while starting
immediately an ambitious reconstruction program as
communicated to the World Bank (World Bank
Report, 1978). As loss affected mainly buildings and
infrastructure works, a strong construction sector
and material resources were necessary for recovery.
Thus, while asking for loans for post-earthquake
recovery, the main targets were constructions for
industrial development and a declared important
issue was to accelerate the capacity of the
construction sector and contributing sub-sectors. A
US$ 60 million credit by the World Bank was
negotiated for 1977-1982. In order to cope with
immediate needs, some planned infrastructure
projects were deferred and resources diverted from
other sectors. The need for the import of construction
materials was urgent, while exports were reduced
and the international borrowing increased.
Strengthening of damaged residential buildings
was rarely achieved and it was not considered to
be a priority; we know that in this respect “orders”
were given in the summer of 1977 to reduce the
amount of strengthening so as to become merely
local repairs. Only in this way could the rehabilitation
works be finished by the end of 1978, as declared.
During 1977, social solidarity was a real fact,
but some “measures” obliged the population to work
“voluntarily” on all Sundays in March 1977, for two
Sundays in April and May 1977 and one Sunday
during the remaining months of 1977. Other
“voluntary” assistance on reconstruction sites was
asked from staff and students. Construction
engineers and workers were taken from other less-
damaged or non-affected zones, while army staff
was used also. The reduced work week was
postponed for two years.
In respect of growth and development issues,
contemporary documents and other more recent
ones stressed-out that:
- for a long time before the 1977 earthquake,
Romania was a fast growing centrally
planned economy, with an average annual
growth of national income of 10% for 1950-
1977; in some comparative studies,
Romania’s industrial manufacturing export
policy was considered a source of growth
since 1965, with growth rates of 11.2% for
1970-1975, neglecting agricultural exports
(Burakow, 1980);
- Romania had the highest average annual
growth per capita GDP of 8.5% for 1960-
1977 out of 125 countries surveyed (World
Bank, 1979), or even a 14.5% growth of
industrial output, the highest in Eastern
Europe (Encyclopedia Americana. Intl. Ed.,
1970);
- Romania used in 1971-75 a ratio of 34.1%
of  GNP  for  development,  50%  of
investment accounted for industry (60% of
GNP and 40% of labor force);
- in 1976, foreign trade exports exceeded
imports for first time (US$ 3,403 million);
- in 1976 the costliest development project
of Romania was restarted, the Danube-
Black Sea Navigation Canal, which was
partially completed in 1984;
- the “success-story” Romania at that time
was relying on its privileged relationships with
Western economies, unique membership
among CMEA countries of IMF, IBRD –
World Bank, and it was a matter of national
pride to continue development as planned;
- the construction sector was critical in this
process and we must evaluate it in the
framework of the situation of that age. Its
performance in the years before the
earthquake was considered disappointing,
as the 1976 investments plan was only half
fulfilled (World Bank, 1978);
- it is symptomatic that the official domestic
development strategies did not consider the
earthquake impact as a threat, since
Romania estimated in 1979 that it would be
able to reach by 1985 a stage of medium
development (citation in Burakow, 1980);
- World  Bank  analysts  have  shown
acceptance of domestic data and an
optimistic view on the continuation of the
highest growth rates in the 1980’s and the
achievements of the development targets
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(Tsantis and Pepper, 1979); however other
analysts (Jackson, 1977, cited in Burakow,
1980; Jackson, 1985) critically evaluated a
series of data and concluded that the
development resources would be exhausted
in the 1980’s and such growth rates were
upwards biased;
- in contradiction with its usual trend of
upwards bias in estimations on communist
economies, CIA data of 1986 reported real
GNP growth rates for Romania as of only
6.7% for 1971-75 and 3.9 % for 1976-80
(CIA, 1986);
- later-on, Lancieri, 1993, re-evaluating the
GNP and growth of East European
economies, put forward the hypothesis that
their technological and organi-zational
evolution basically stopped in the early
1970’s.
With regard to the foreign debt issues, the World
Bank data and other recently available studies
(Deletant, 2002, Deletant and Ionescu, 2004,
Georgescu and Pomonis, 2007, 2008), stressed-
out that:
- the international context of energy market
prices was already unfavorable; the domestic
refining capacities required crude oil import
and the 1978 revolution in Iran cut
affordable import sources;
- after the floods of 1970-1975 in Romania,
foreign credits were taken; in June 1977 the
medium and long-term external debt
reached US$ 3,266 million, mostly from
West European creditors, USA and Japan;
not entirely and necessarily related to the
earthquake loss, yearly payments were in
the range of US$ 700 million in 1978 and
1979, while foreign debts raised to US$
10.2 billion in 1981 and over US$ 11 billion
in 1982, leading to a request of debt
payments rescheduling in 1981;
- given that the 1977 earthquake loss possibly
had a negative influence on the foreign trade
debt balance lasting until 1981, as well as
on the construc-tion sector, already
overloaded, the solution was a forced
reduction of imports and some isolation from
the Western economies. The priority given
to the machine-construction industry was in
some  contradiction  with  what  the
construction sector could achieve without
competitive equipment, although the loans
were also for such aims;
- at the end of 1982 the regime leader decided
to pay off all debts abroad by 1990.
Because of this ambition, a harsh austerity
program started, with food rationing
between 1982-1983, forced savings of
energy, heat supply cuts in 1984-1985;
- unfortunately, the 1977 earthquake was also
used  as  a  pretext  to  launch  the
“systematization program” first proposed in
1974, which practically was the razing to
the ground of urban and rural heritage. The
need for repair or strengthening of affected
buildings was replaced by hazardous
planning decisions, i.e. the demolition of old
houses and many villages, although they did
not pose any risk for mass casualties. The
damaged pre-1940 high-rise buildings were
only given a face-lift. Therefore, after
1970’s, vital resources were wasted to
demolish and then rebuild 29 traditional town
centres and to reshape up to mutilation point
another 37 cities (the new Civic Center of
Bucharest is a well publicized case), while
at the same time the most vulnerable
buildings that were damaged by the
earthquake were left practically untouched
(Giurescu,  1989).  Turnock  (1991)
discusses in detail the “systematization
program” and its effect on rural settlements
in Romania and proposes that the 1977
earthquake may have eventually served as
a delaying factor to the completion of the
“systematization program” that would have
had disastrous consequences for Romanian
farmers;
- thus, five years after 1977, under the
combined effect of the earthquake, floods,
the sudden increase of international interest
rates and due to its own economy’s systemic
weakness (artificial and low-quality
production, pumping funds into huge energy
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inefficient and loss making chemical and steel
processing  plants  that  generated
environment pollution problems etc.),
Romania was faced with an economic crisis
considered by the cited analysts as “deep”
and in a “profound stagnation”;
- the resilience of the Romanian economy to
the impact of the earthquake was of interest
even to the KGB, as their high level officials
expected harsh conditions and even econo-
mic collapse (Andrew and Gordievsky,
1990).
Under the UNO system of national accounts
reporting, the usual statistical data can be a reliable
source of information on a disaster’s impact.  In time,
some countries presented more unfavorable impacts
(sudden decrease in GNP), for instance Japan after
1923, Mexico after 1985 and El Salvador after 1986
earthquakes respectively. Disasters lead also to a
“heating” of sectors involved in recovery. These
“visible” earthquake effects on economic indicators
should be considered with care, since the
interference of direct and indirect losses under
different circumstances around the world can be
misleading.
In case of Romanian statistical economic data
before and after 1977, the impact is somehow
visible, although it cannot be entirely caused by the
earthquake, as follows (Georgescu and Pomonis,
2007, 2008):
- the GNP graph in Figure 2 shows a decline in
growth rates; the material product in
construction stagnated and then decreased,
after 1977 (DCS data in Jackson, 1985);
growth rates decreased after 1977 until 1979
for Net Material Product, agriculture and
industrial activities, while constructions grew
in 1977 but dropped sharply in 1978 and
1979 (UNSY, 1980).
4.HUMAN CASUALTY PATTERNS VS.
BUILDING COLLAPSE PATTERN
AND SEARCH AND RESCUE NEEDS
IN MARCH 4, 1977 EARTHQUAKE
Concerning human-social impact, data from the
Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America,
BSSA (1978) give an estimation on April 30, 1977
with a 1,578 deaths (1,424 deaths in Bucharest and
Fig. 2. Romania’s GNP evolution (1975-1983) shows some decrease in the growth ratio in 1976-1979,
attributable to a certain extent to the 1977 earthquake (data from Romanian sources
communicated to World Bank experts, Jackson, 1985)
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Fig. 3. Romania’s foreign trade balance (1970-1986) was influenced by the impact
of natural disasters as well as by the international economic situation and
political decisions. The visible impact of 1977 earthquake must be
considered in conjunction with other factors
Fig. 4. Inetrnational tourist arrivals and resulting income in Romania (1969-1988) was mainly impacted
by the international economic situation and domestic political decisions but natural
disasters may have also played a part
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154 in the rest of the country), 11,321 injured (7,598
in Bucharest and 3,723 in the rest of the country)
and 200,000 homeless. The figure of 1,578 deaths
is cited also by US Congress Records, 1977. Other
sources give 1,541 deaths and 11,275 injured (out
of which 1,200 deaths and 7,576 injured in
Bucharest) (Steiner and Manastireanu, 1996).
The overall casualty figures for Romania and
Bucharest and spatial distribution of the human
casualties are presented in Table 4. Some of the
casualty distribution patterns may positively correlate
to the damage distribution pattern but not to full
extent. In rural areas the damage was not associated
with heavy loss of life, e.g. the town of Zimnicea on
the Danube was heavily affected but only a handful
of deceased persons have been reported (Moinfar,
1978; Tezcan, 1977, Georgescu, 2002 a). The ratio
of reported injuries to deaths was 7 (5.3 in Bucharest
and 22.9 in the rest of the country) which is equal to
the average injury to death ratio experienced in Japan
during the period 1946-2006 (Pomonis, 2005).
Table 4.
 The spatial distribution of human casualties in Romania due to the Vrancea,
March 4, 1977 earthquake (Georgescu and Pomonis, 2010, 2011)
In the 1977 earthquake, the casualties were
concentrated in Bucharest, with 90.2% of the killed
and 67.1% of the injured. In Table 5 we summarize
the information we have collected so far for each of
the 29 collapsed buildings in Bucharest. Due to the
time of occurrence (9:21 pm local time) the bulk of
the fatalities was due to the total or partial collapse
of 23 pre-1940 residential high-rise reinforced
concrete frame structures, not designed to withstand
earthquakes. These were situated in the city centre
and mostly on street corners. Most of these buildings
had also been damaged by the 1940 earthquake
but had not been strengthened properly (World
Bank, 1978). In addition about 150 buildings of this
category were seriously damaged and many were
subsequently demolished. Furthermore 4 non-
residential buildings collapsed (a 4-storey hotel, the
Ministry of Metalurgy, the Computer Centre and
the Chemistry Faculty building of the University of
Bucharest; the latter had been seriously damaged
during World War II bombing). There was also the
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partial collapse of 2 residential high-rise reinforced
concrete shear wall structures (Block 30 and Block
OD16). These had 10 and 11 storeys and were built
in 1962 and 1974 respectively. The collapse of these
two blocks affected 77 apartment units in total. At
the time there existed 185,000 such modern
apartment units (all constructed after 1950). In
addition there was the collapse of four pre-1940
mid-rise unreinforced brick masonry buildings of 3
to 6 storeys two of which were the aforementioned
hotel and Chemistry faculty buildings. The 3-
storeyed Computer Centre of the Ministry of
Transport and Communi-cations was built in 1968
and was a reinforced concrete waffle slab structure
on columns with capitals in the form of truncated
square pyramid at ground storey.
The number of people killed and rescued in
each of the collapsed buildings is not exactly known,
but some data were collected by the authors mainly
from survivors’ memories and press reports. We
identified the collapse patterns by collecting photos
and processed casualty and rescue data for some
of the 29 collapsed buildings. Pancake collapse
pattern was common for the pre-1940 structures,
while shear-wall failure and soft-storey were causes
for the collapse of the three modern buildings that
had lower levels of volume loss. Loss of volume
ratio was in the range of 0.15 to 0.85.  Some of
them fit to loss of volume and casualties ratio in the
international literature (e.g. Pomonis et al., 2011;
Pomonis et al., 1991).
We estimate that high lethality (> 50%) occurred
in the main Bucharest collapse sites as the collapse
pattern was quite extreme in most of the pre-1940
residential blocks, and inhabitant’s chances of survival
would have been diminished by the relatively low
tempera-tures during the first and critical night. Causes
of deaths and injuries were the crushing under concrete
or under members or parts of buildings and falling of
non-structural members.
The number of killed, injured and hospitalised
in Romania after the March 4, 1977 Vrancea
earthquake was preliminarily recovered, mostly from
press sources, checked for final values with the
BSSA data, and is presented in Figures 5 and 6.
Based on these, a distribution of casualties was
estimated, for the sum of final numbers of fatalities,
light to moderate injuries and victims hospitalized (a
total of 12,899 casualties), as represented in Figure
5. We propose a total for the event at 1,700 deaths
and 11,500 injured (incl. the casualties that occurred
due to building collapse and other causes in Bulgaria
and the Republic of Moldova). The 1977 event killed
120 people (Tzenov and Botev, 2009) and injured
around 165 in Bulgaria, most of them caused by the
collapse of 4 buildings in the town of Svishtov (on
the southern shores of the Danube River). It also
caused some injuries in Yugoslavia and 2 deaths in
the Republic of Moldova.
These data are influenced by the number and
patterns of Bucharest casualties, with victims under
concrete debris and they are not necessarily
simultaneously valid, per each day, as it was a
continuous flow of entries and exits from hospitals.
To a certain extent, the figures provide also an image
about the speed of extrication as well as about the
ratios between killed and injured. The pattern of
injuries was reported by Steiner and Manastireanu
(1996) for 6,980 patients, and some 49.7% were
treated for surgical and orthopaedic wounds. More
details about the geographic distribution of the
casualties including those outside Romania during
the 1977 earthquake are given in Georgescu and
Pomonis (2010).
Search and rescue needs were extensive as 23
of the 29 collapsed buildings were heavily occupied
residential structures with 15 to 89 apartments in
each and extrication of the trapped was very difficult.
Fire occurred after collapse in several cases. As a
result of intensive work, the emergency state was
ceased on March 10, 1977 in the country, but in
Bucharest it continued for many more days (e.g.
Boulevard Magheru, the main traffic artery in the
city centre was closed for more than a week).
5.CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR
SEISMIC RISK REDUCTION
STRATEGIES
5.1. Physical and economic losses of 1977
vs. territorial distribution and hidden
damage threat
The loss and impact data proves that the 1977
earthquake was a disaster of great consequences
that affected numerous citizens, destroyed and
damaged a significant proportion of the residential
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Table 5.
List of the 29 buildings that collapsed in Bucharest during the March 4, 1977 earthquake, in
correlation with emergency management issues (partial data from unofficial sources)
(Georgescu and Pomonis, 2010, 2011)
Notes: RC-reinforced concrete; Fr- Frames; URM-Unreinforced Masonry; SW-Shear Walls
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Fig. 5. Estimated distribution of casualties in 1977
earthquake, in Romania
Fig. 6. The number of killed, injured
and hospitalised after March 4,
1977 Vrancea earthquake, in Romania
and non-residential building stock of Romania and
affected a large portion of Romania, adding strain
to the economy and its future prospects.  This
disaster concurred with the 1970’s Romanian floods
to contribute towards the very difficult economic and
social situation of the 1980’s in Romania. Some
negative impact was immediately visible, while other
had a period of “incubation”, depending on internal
and international situation. In this respect, World
Bank analysts considered that an improved efficiency
of the Romanian economy was highly necessary.
They also mentioned that “the bulk of the burden of
recovery has been borne by the Romanian
population with some external rehabilitation
assistance” (World Bank Report, 1978).
The term of “ambivalence and ambi-guities”
used by Deletant, 2002 for Romanian politics under
the Warsaw Pact, could possibly be true for the
attitude on earthquake risk reduction as well.
Immediately after the earthquake, contacts with all
foreign visiting experts and consultants were quite
free and the opening towards the international scien-
tific community was extremely beneficial for
Romanian researchers.
The 1977 earthquake provided a great scientific
laboratory, based on unique and valuable lessons in
seismological and engineering terms and led to a
change in concepts and regulations. Two projects
on seismic risk financed by United Nations agencies
started in the region, with evalu-ations, case studies,
seminars and fellowships. But although professional
institutions and the Romanian Association of Civil
Engineers promoted activities and regulations in order
to mitigate the earthquake risk, the official actions
were mostly concerned with other development
projects and neglected the potential for disaster from
future earthquakes.
In fact, for more than a decade (1977-1989)
the large-scale works needed for the seismic risk
reduction of existing buildings were subject to a
stalemate. There is a striking difference between the
huge damage caused to 20 counties and the
subsequent funds allocated to rehabilitation and
strengthening. In the summer of 1977 public policies
enforced the rule of limited repair and strengthening
by local interventions for cosmetic purposes to
“reach the pre-earthquake safety level”.
Unfortunately, the use of local resources
prevailed over other needs, therefore the USA funds
and World Bank credits for a National Center for
Earthquake Engineering at INCERC were replaced
with local currency funds and „costly” imported
equipment was replaced by “alternative” local
solutions. This idea caused the Center completion
to be delayed for years and the shaking-tables
eventually failed to be equipped. The same delay
happened with the equipments of the Computing
Center of the Ministry of Transportation that
collapsed in the earthquake (World Bank, 1983).
The 1983 World Bank report evaluating the post-
earthquake loan to Romania stated that “it had a
major positive impact on Romania’s economic
performance during the 1976-1980 Five Year Plan
and thereafter, fulfilled the tasks of reconstruction
and strengthening the construction sector and
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building materials, with a high growth, while failing
to limit the damage from future earthquakes through
the National Earthquake Protection Plan”.
The re-evaluation of past earthquake losses
requires access to more data and archives which
with time will provide new insights. The re-evaluation
of loss to GNP ratio, as well as other specific studies,
can provide a clearer picture of what happened, but
is still dependent on a better estimation of Romania’s
true GNP at that time.
According to current estimations, we have
reached a new insight on losses and the range of
direct loss to GDP or GNP ratio in 1977 could have
been from 4.9 to 7.8%, while the range of total loss
to GDP or GNP ratio in 1977 could have been from
6.0% to 9.5%. Adding further indirect losses that
were unaccounted at the time brings the range of
total possible loss ratio to GDP or GNP in 1977 to
between 13.3% and 21.1%. Such values are
considerably closer to the strong negative impact
that was felt by the entire economy and society for
more that a decade, until the political system’s
collapse in late 1989 and later on. They also better
compare to losses of other countries in the southeast
of Europe (Italy, ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey and
Greece).
The impact of the 1977 earthquake is still a
threat to Romania’s future development prospects.
We know that there are hidden, neglected or un-
repaired damages which represent the roots of future
cumulative structural vulnerability, a bitter heritage
from 1977 for today’s society, which may possibly
suffer and pay for another earthquake disaster in
years to come.  We consider that the re-evaluation
of the 1977 earthquake’s socio-economic
consequences, must be the benchmark for a new
strategy on seismic risk reduction in Romania which
if successful would prevent further large scale
impacts. The recurrence cycle of great Vrancea
earthquakes represents a warning. In this context,
Romania’s EU integration and the new Romanian
Earthquake Design Codes based on Eurocode
requirements on earthquake recurrence intervals of
100 and 475 years return period must be tackled
with due concern.
5.2. Human casualties pattern vs. collapse
pattern and territorial distribution
The study recovered and interpreted data about
the human casualties caused by the 1977 earthquake.
The data show that some towns and counties located
at large distances from the Vrancea source zone
suffered heavy damage and some casualties in 1977,
but the cumulative damage effects, especially to pre-
1940 high-rise buildings, explains the concentration
of losses and casualties in Bucharest.
In terms of preparedness for future Vrancea
earthquakes the data recovered and interpreted
about human casualties and search and rescue
operations after the 1977 earthquake, were primarily
related to the collapse of 23 pre-1940 high-rise
apartment buildings, especially in Bucharest. Other
pre-1977 low-code buildings, with soft-story
weaknesses and low-ductility are also a threat and
may collapse causing further casualties (though these
have a much lower collapse probability). The stock
of low-rise and mid-rise old masonry buildings is
still numerous in rural Romania and smaller towns in
Vrancea, Muntenia and Moldova regions, but their
casualty potential is not as great, though it can be a
burden for health and financial assis-tance. Ratios
of injured to killed in overall casualties in Romania
was 7.17 in 1977 and 5.33 in Bucharest.
In 1978 a new earthquake code was introduced
and subsequently upgraded in 1992 and 2006,
significantly reducing the seismic resistance of
buildings and their probability of collapse. However,
structural alterations and aging of pre-1977 buildings
is an additional concern.
We are concerned that there remain at least 100
and perhaps as many as 250 collapse candidate
buildings in Bucharest and other cities of south-
eastern and north-eastern Romania, many of which
have been damaged by the 1940, 1977, 1986 and
1990 Vrancea earthquakes. Buildings in this category
have been registered and signposted by the
authorities in Bucharest and other cities but only
about around 20 have been strengthened so far.
Many of these are multi-storey, high occupancy
buildings and can be a great risk to life in case of
partial or total collapse. Search and rescue in case
of tall building collapse is a very difficult task and
requires extremely rapid mobilization and heavy
equipment in many locations.
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As a strategic thinking for emergency
management, the following measures are of utmost
importance and will have the greatest mitigation
potential:
- strengthening that prevents the potential
collapse of the already identified “high-risk”
structures, incl. weak-story or overturning
effects; this measure would considerably
mitigate potential deaths and injuries from
Vrancea earthquakes in Bucharest and
other cities;
- publicly-funded subsidies incl. funds for
interim relocation housing during the
strengthening or demolition and replacement
of the “high-risk” buildings;
- prevention of wall and roof collapse in rural
weak masonry buildings, by introduction of
collar beams;
- training for search and rescue in specific
collapse  patterns,  using  advanced
instruments for victims detection and
equipment for speedy extrication.
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